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EXPLORING THE WRIT OF REPLEVIN AS A
PRE-JUDGMENT REMEDY FOR PROTECTING
EXOTIC ANIMALS
BAILEY FRANK*

INTRODUCTION
In December 2019, rescuers from the Wild Animal Sanctuary
showed up to Cricket Hollow Zoo, located in Manchester, Iowa, with
a court order to rehome exotic animals living in cages that were barely
big enough to walk around in and were “squalid, dirty, and filled with
feces.”1 The Sanctuary was prepared to take all of the large carnivores,
but when they showed up, “pretty much all the cages were empty.”2
The animals were missing - including four grizzly bears, two mountain
lions, and a wolf. The Sanctuary left with only a third of the animals on
their list.3 Eventually, they were able to track down 40 additional
animals, but many more were never located, presumed to have been
given away, sold, or even killed.4
Just two years earlier, in July 2017, Dade City Wild Things in
Dade City, Florida, had transferred 19 tigers to a roadside zoo (that
would coincidentally become the topic of Netflix’s infamous “Tiger
King” docuseries) in violation of a court order not to remove any
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1. Ashley Neighbor, More than 400 animals rescued from Cricket Hollow Zoo, still more
missing, KWWL NEWS 7 (Dec. 10, 2019 6:53 PM), https://kwwl.com/2019/12/10/at-least-166animals-rescued-23-missing-after-cricket-hollow-zoo-removal/.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
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animals from their premises.5 A Colorado sanctuary was eventually
able to remove and rehome the animals, but only after an additional
court order approximately 5 months later. 6
These occurrences highlight the reality that even when litigation
under the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”) is successful and
advocates can declare legal victory, an already rare occurrence, there
is little to actually prevent animals from being abused, or even killed,
prior to a final judgment in the case. Tools like preliminary injunctions
and temporary restraining orders do little to protect the animals from
abuse because the abuser retains possession and may simply choose to
ignore those orders and injunctions. In an effort to protect endangered
animals during litigation and ensure they are safely rehomed in a
sanctuary or rescue, this paper will examine the possibility of using the
common law property doctrine “writ of replevin” to remove
endangered animals from abusers and place them in a sanctuary while
litigation is ongoing.
First, this paper will describe the uses of prejudgment remedies
under the ESA. Next, this paper will analyze applications of writ of
replevin for animals and statutory interpretations of illegal “take”
under both the ESA and writ of replevin statutes. Finally, this paper
will identify potential uses for writs of replevin to protect endangered
animals and propose potential legal and factual arguments for use in
future litigation.

I.

THE ESA AND PREJUDGMENT REMEDIES

Virtually all cases involving the well-being of exotic animals are
brought under the ESA, largely due to the citizen suit provision,7 but
also because it is one of the only legal remedies available for the
protection of animals. The ESA was passed in 1973 to “protect and
recover imperiled species and the ecosystems upon which they
depend.”8 For litigation purposes, § 1538 (often referred to as “Section
9”) is especially important, as it makes it unlawful for any person to
5. Tracey McManus, Dade City’s Wild Things closes amid legal fight. Its last 6 tigers are
moved,
TAMPA
BAY
TIMES
(Apr.
1,
2020),
https://www.tampabay.com/news/business/2020/04/01/dade-citys-wild-things-closes-amid-legalfight-its-last-6-tigers-are-moved/.
6. Id.
7. 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(1)(A).
8. 16 U.S.C. § 1531 et seq.
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“take” a protected species,9 which means to “harass, harm, pursue,
hunt, wound, kill, capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in any
such conduct.”10
Many endangered animal cases involve the use of prejudgment
tools, available prior to a final judgment while litigation is ongoing, to
stop abuse. The most common prejudgment tools are temporary
restraining orders (TROs) and preliminary injunctions. A TRO is
permissible under Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
(FRCP) only if “specific facts in an affidavit or verified complaint
clearly show that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will
result to the movant before the adverse party can be heard in
opposition.”11 Courts largely view TROs as “an extraordinary remedy”
where the right to relief is “clear and unequivocal.”12 More
importantly, a TRO is only valid for a maximum of 14 days.13 A
preliminary injunction is also governed by Rule 65 of the FRCP,14 but
its purpose differs in that it “is merely to preserve the relative positions
of the parties until a trial on the merits can be held.”15 To grant a
preliminary injunction, a federal district court considers four factors:
“whether the plaintiff will be irreparably harmed if the injunction does
not issue; whether the defendant will be harmed if the injunction does
issue; whether the public interest will be served by the injunction; and
whether the plaintiff is likely to prevail on the merits.”16
One of the most recent examples of both a TRO and preliminary
injunction in endangered species litigation is People for the Ethical
Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. Wildlife in Need and Wildlife in Deed,
INC. Both a TRO and a preliminary injunction were successfully
granted for violation of the ESA, but the animals were not removed
from the care of the abuser until several months of litigation had
occurred, during which time they were subjected to additional abuse.17
In Wildlife in Need, the court granted a TRO that “temporarily
restrained [the defendant] from declawing any cats absent a medical
9. 16 U.S.C. § 1538.
10. 16 U.S.C. § 1532.
11. Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1)(A).
12. 19 Fed. Proc., L. Ed. § 47:83.
13. Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(2).
14. Fed. R. Civ. P. 65.
15. Univ. of Tex. v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981).
16. Id. at 392.
17. 476 F. Supp. 3d 765, 774 (S.D. Ind. 2020). Notably, the court also characterized the ESA
as “a product of the decade-long push for animal rights legislation,” which is a rather unique and
important characterization distinct from “animal welfare” legislation.
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necessity supported by a veterinarian’s opinion.”18 People for the
Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) then successfully argued for a
preliminary injunction against both declawing and the separation of
cubs from their mothers “absent a medical necessity.”19 The defendant
proceeded to lie to the court in defiance of the order and separated
cubs a few weeks later. Just a few weeks after that, the defendant defied
a court preservation order by transferring some of their animals to
another facility out of state.20 Additionally, the defendant’s license to
exhibit animals was revoked by the United States Department of
Agriculture (USDA) almost six months prior to the conclusion of the
litigation.21 Nevertheless, it still took a permanent injunction, a special
master/guardian ad litem, and additional motions to finally remove the
animals from a situation so abusive that the court “ha[d] little difficulty
concluding such conduct” violated the ESA.22
Notably, a lawsuit was recently brought by the federal
government where the Attorney General moved for a TRO requiring
the defendants “to relinquish custody and control of all Big Cat cubs
one year old or younger, along with the cubs’ respective mothers, to
the United States for temporary placement at reputable facilities
selected by the United States.”23 The court granted the motion, noting
the “Defendants' habit, pattern, and practice of providing inadequate
nutrition and timely veterinary care, and failure to employ an attending
veterinarian, has resulted in injury - and even death - to a number of
their animals, including ESA-protected animals such as Nala, Gizzy,
Dot, Mama, Lizzie, Promise, Petunia, and Young Yi.”24 The authority
of the Attorney General to take custody of the animals is undisputed
in the case, and similar outcomes should be available to reputable
sanctuaries in a civil lawsuit where animals are in danger of being
irreparably harmed.
The fact that animals are classified as mere property under the
law is often framed as a problem in animal rights discourse, namely
because animals should not be viewed or treated as property.
18. Id. at 771.
19. Id. at 773.
20. Id. This appears to be a common trend among roadside zoos that future scholars may
find worthwhile of additional attention. Are they under the misguided impression that this
exempts them from liability? Do they simply want to avoid handing over the animals at any cost?
What is the motivation for this conduct?
21. Id. at 770.
22. Id. at 765.
23. United States v. Lowe, No. 20-cv-0423-JFH, 2021 WL 149838, at *2 (E.D. OK 2021).
24. Id. at *14.
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Operating in the current legal framework, however, it may be
appropriate to start investigating ways to use traditional, common law
property doctrine in service of the animals – even if it means arguing
for a possessory interest in another living creature. In this vein, this
paper will explore the common law property doctrine of writ of
replevin, while keeping in mind that all of this is always for the animals.
II.

WHAT IS A “WRIT” OR “REPLEVIN” ANYWAY?

Accord to Black’s Law Dictionary, a “writ” is a court’s written
order commanding the addressee to do or refrain from doing some
specified act.25 Replevin is a type of remedy for which a writ is issued,
namely the remedy “to recover the possession of every kind of personal
property to which the plaintiff has the right to present or immediate
possession.”26 Replevin “may be maintained not only for the unlawful
taking but for the unlawful detention of property.”27 The defendant in
an act of replevin must have committed “an actual taking” or “actual
detention” for replevin to apply.28
As most ESA cases are in federal courts, the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure (FRCP) on writ of replevin generally apply. Rule 64(a)
directs federal courts to apply “every remedy” available under the law
of the state, meaning courts should look to the respective state’s writ of
replevin statute.29 Rule 64(b) also specifies the remedies available
“regardless of whether state procedure requires an independent
action.”30 The most relevant remedies for this paper are the remedy of
attachment and replevin. For purposes of analysis, this paper will
consider North Carolina General Statute Chapter 36, §§ 1-472 –484.1.
Notably, a replevin may not distinguish between “tangible” and
“intangible” property—in other words, dogs have the same status as
patents.31 A plaintiff in a replevin action must be able to (1) establish
possession of the “goods or chattels” within the meaning of the
replevin statute and (2) establish a property interest in the property

25. Writ, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
26. 66 AM. JUR. 2D Replevin § 6.
27. J.E. Cobbey, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF REPLEVIN AS ADMINISTERED
BY THE COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES 7, 34 (2d ed. 1900).
28. Id. at 37.
29. Fed. R. Civ. P. 64(a).
30. Fed. R. Civ. P. 64(b).
31. J.E. Cobbey, supra note 27 at 41.
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being detained.32 The existence ofboth elements is often referred to as
a ‘possessory interest.’33 Despite having its origins in common law
courts at law for centuries, the exact right of possession that will
support a replevin is “difficult to say.”34 For example, ownership or title
is not necessary, and in general, “[a] right to the possession of the thing
sued for is sufficient.”35 Yet, some cases hold that “[o]wnership
alonewithout possession is not sufficient” to support an action.36 The
line between ‘ownership’ versus ‘possession’ is not clear in the case law,
but it is clear that a right to possession is both distinct from physical
ownership and “indispensable to maintain the action.”37 Indeed, as
characterized by Vermont Law Professor Steven Wise, it is “the right
to possession that usually beats at replevin’s heart.”38
For prejudgment replevin, a plaintiff “must show a probability of
prevailing or a danger of losing the property” unless it is removed from
the defendant’s possession.39 The plaintiff must also, similar to the
preliminary injunction standard, show a likelihood of prevailing on the
claim in final judgment. In Koerner v. Nielsen, where an ex-girlfriend
brought an action in replevin against her ex-partner for ownership of
their dog,40 the court noted that the plaintiff bears the burden of proof
for establishing (1) lawful possession of the property (dog); (2) that the
defendant wrongfully detained the property (violated possessory
interest); and (3) that the defendant refused to deliver the property to
the plaintiff. 41
Additionally, because prejudgment replevin involves the seizure
of property prior to a final judgment, Due Process concerns are
implicated.42 To satisfy Due Process, a replevin statute must provide an

32. 66 AM. JUR. 2D Replevin § 6.
33. See, e.g., Johnson v. American First Fed., Inc.133 So. 3d 559, 561 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2014) (“‘Replevin’ is a possessory statutory interest at law.”); SEIU Healthcare Northwest
Training Partnership v. Evergreen Freedom Foundation, 427 P.3d 688, 695 (Wash. Ct. App. 2018)
(noting that an organization had superior “possessory interest”).
34. J.E. Cobbey, supra note 27 at 51.
35. Id. at 52.
36. Id.
37. J.E. Cobbey, A Practical Treatise on the law of Replevin as Administered by the Courts
of the United States 7, 54 (2d ed. 1900).
38. Steven M. Wise, The Entitlement of Chimpanzees to the Common law Writs of Habeas
Corpus and De Homine Replegiando, 37 Golden Gate U.L.Rev. 219, 246 (2007).
39. 77 C.J.S. Replevin § 43.
40. 8 N.E.3d 161, 164 (Il. App. Ct. 2014).
41. Id.
42. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 93 (1972) (The Supreme Court struck down two
Florida writ of replevin statutes for violating Due Process requirements of the 14th Amendment).
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opportunity to be heard before the property is taken and notice of the
hearing is required.43 For example, North Carolina’s replevin statute §
1-474.1 articulates the notice and hearing requirements and lays out
means of waiving the rights to notice and hearing which “shall not be
permitted except as set forth” in the statute.44
If prejudgment replevin is successful, the court will attach the
property (depending on the state statute) as a remedy. This means the
property would be brought “within the legal custody of the court.”45
For example, sheriff must keep the property “in a secure place” and
“deliver [the property] to the party entitled thereto” upon receipt of
any lawful fees.46 Depending on the state, this may involve giving the
property to the plaintiff in exchange for payment or bond. North
Carolina’s replevin statute § 1-475 requires a “written undertaking” to
the effect that the plaintiffs “are bound in double the value of the
property” in the event that seizure of property was mistaken.47
Plaintiffs under this statute can be liable for damages due to
“deterioration” and may be required to pay interest on damages for
wrongful seizure.48

III.

COULD LAWYERS USE A WRIT OF REPLEVIN IN ESA
CASES?

To establish the right to prejudgment writ of replevin, a plaintiff
must be able to prove a possessory interest. This section suggests a few
ways to argue this interest, analyzed below:
(1) A “taking” under the Endangered Species Act (ESA) should
be the same as a wrongful taking under replevin and confer a
possessory interest.
One of the traditional ways of establishing a possessory interest

43. The Supreme Court would likely apply the five-part test for due process as set forth in
Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974). See Gazil, Inc. v. Super Food Services Inc., 356
So. 2d 312 (Fla. 1978) (The Florida Supreme Court applied the five-part Mitchell test to uphold a
writ of replevin statute).
44. 36 § N.C.G.S. § 1-474.1.
45. 2A N.C. Index 4th Attachment and Garnishment § 2.
46. 36 N.C.G.S. § 1-481.
47. 36 N.C.G.S. § 1-475.
48. Id.
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is to allege an “unlawful taking” by the defendant. Under the ESA, a
violation of the Act is considered a taking, defined as “to harass, harm,
pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt
to engage in any such conduct.”49 Congress’s intentional use of the
word taking could support an argument for legislative intent – namely,
the word taking was selected because of its connection to traditional
property doctrine.50 Conversely, because the ESA provides a statutory
definition for take, writ of replevin statutes could involve looking to the
plain meaning of the word, which is generally broad.51 Indeed, a Court
of Appeals in Minnesota noted:
[T]he word “take” is fairly complicated. The Compact Oxford
English Dictionary, for example, devotes approximately 16 pages to
the word's various definitions and etymology. Compact Oxford English
Dictionary 557–73 (2d ed.1991). The ninth edition of Black's Law
Dictionary uses approximately two pages to define “take” in various
contexts, but the first definition listed is “[t]o obtain possession or
control, whether legally or illegally.” Black's Law Dictionary 1590–92
(9th ed.2009). The definition of “taking,” however, includes a criminaland tort-law context with the following definition: “[t]he act of seizing
an article, with or without removing it, but with an implicit transfer of
possession or control.” Id. at 1591.52
Additionally, the ESA’s citizen suit provision could help
establish the possessory interest for the plaintiff bringing the suit.53
Since the plaintiff in an ESA case both identifies and seeks to remedy
the taking, they should have a possessory interest in the property at
issue.
(2) A sanctuary with plans to rehome the animals at issue has
received a USDA license and been designated as the
appropriate rescue facility, thus conferring a possessory
interest under the ESA.
Traditionally, sanctuaries designated for the rehoming of

49. 16 U.S.C. § 1532.
50. The research into specific legislative history behind the crafting of the ESA “take”
language was outside the scope of this paper, but it is worth further research.
51. See State v. Nicholson, No. A14-2121, 2015 WL 7356588, at *2 (Mn. Ct. App. Nov.23,
2015) (emphasis added).
52. Id.
53. Section 11 of the ESA allows any person to enjoin any other person for violating the
act. See 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(1)(A).
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animals are determined after a final judgment has been rendered.54
Instead, a plaintiff could ask the court to select a sanctuary or rescue
that meets all the necessary criteria prior to litigation.55 Not only would
this assist with efficiency of execution of the final remedy, but it could
also establish a possessory interest where the animal rescue joins the
suit as a plaintiff. Even without the possessory interest, identifying the
proper location for rehoming early on in the litigation could help
prevent abusers from hiding, selling, or killing the animals while they
wait for execution of a final judgment.
(3) The government has a possessory interest through the USDA
regulation of endangered animals.
In lieu of a citizen suit, the government agency responsible for
administering the ESA could bring a suit for the taking of endangered
animals using a similar argument for a possessory interest as noted in
subsection 1. Moreover, USDA’s interpretation of “take” as providing
a possessory interest could be read to have Chevron deference,
depending on how broadly a court is willing to interpret the statutory
definition of “take.”56
Additionally, if a plaintiff can satisfy the requirements for the
“extraordinary remedy” of TRO and prove irreparable injury for a
preliminary injunction, they can almost certainly prove risk of
destruction if the endangered animals were to remain in the possession
of the defendant. Ultimately, a court’s willingness to find a possessory
interest will also rest on the state’s replevin statute and applicable case
law.

54. See Wildlife in Deed, 476 F.Supp.3d at 785 (“Within 30 days, PETA shall file a motion
(with appropriate evidence) to appoint a special master and identify a reputable wildlife
sanctuary.”)
55. The exact procedure for requesting such action is beyond the scope of this paper.
56. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resource Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). An
agency’s interpretation of its organic statute is afforded deference for both substantive and
procedural issues under Chevron. Courts will typically uphold agency action unless (1) the agency
action a clear violation of the statute or (2) the agency action is not based on a reasonable
interpretation of the statute. See also Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638, 649 (1990) (“A
precondition to deference under Chevron is a congressional delegation of administrative
authority.”).
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CONCLUSION

By (erroneously) continuing to hold animals as property under
the law, the legal system has incentivized the investigation of commonlaw property doctrines as a means to protect endangered animals in
court. A prejudgment writ of replevin could be a useful tool if the
parties are able to establish a possessory interest. This is most likely to
occur in a case that is (1) brought under an ESA cause of action; (2)
involves clear takings under the ESA and is thus likely to prevail on
the merits; and (3) is in a State with a replevin statute that is amendable
to the common-law notion of possessory interest.
There are also several areas of further research related to
replevin as a tool for animal protection. First, if animal advocates can
convince the USDA to argue for possessory interests under the ESA,
there could be positive implications for animals under administrative
law. Second, the procedure for requesting rehoming at specific
sanctuaries after litigation has concluded could be adjusted in ways that
would benefit animals. For example, earlier determinations of
rehoming facilities may help deter further abuse to animals after a final
judgment has been issued. Overall, it is worth prioritizing research on
tools to make success in litigation under the ESA more effective. A win
on behalf of endangered animals should be a win for the animals, and
all available tools, even if they seem outside the scope of immediate
relevance, should be considered.

